Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
不完全信息下大型匹配市场中嫉妒的极限
A limit to envy in large matching markets with incomplete information
摘要
We study matching markets in which each man has a common value for all women and a private value specific to each woman. We introduce a new class of procedures, which is a novel way of studying the deferred acceptance mechanism. These procedures can be replicated by another procedure, in which a woman proposes to a random man in each step. Envy in a matching market is bounded by envy in this class of procedures, in which there is just one woman and two types of men. In large markets, envy goes to zero; moreover, the deferred acceptance mechanism is approximately strategy-proof.
中文摘要
我们研究匹配市场，其中每位男性对所有女性有一个共同价值，并对每位女性有一个特定私人价值。我们引入了一类新的程序，这是研究延迟接受机制的一种新颖方式。这些程序可以通过另一种程序复制，在该程序中，女性在每一步向随机男性提出建议。匹配市场中的嫉妒程度受限于这类程序中仅有一位女性和两类男性的嫉妒程度。在大市场中，嫉妒趋于零；此外，延迟接受机制近似于策略证明性。