Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
未来阴影下合作分析的新方法：理论与实验证据
A new approach to the analysis of cooperation under the shadow of the future: Theory and experimental evidence
摘要
The theory of infinitely repeated games may lack predictive power due to its insensitivity to, for example, changes in some game parameters, the timing of players' moves, and communication possibilities. We propose a new approach by studying an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game and its variants where preferences for cooperation are heterogeneous, and strategic risk arises from incomplete information about opponents' preferences. Our model generates a rich set of comparative static predictions in a variety of settings. We show that, unlike standard theory and other existing models, our approach organizes the findings of a host of experiments including our novel experiments.
中文摘要
无限重复博弈理论可能因对某些博弈参数变化、玩家行动时机及沟通可能性等因素不敏感而缺乏预测力。我们提出一种新方法，通过研究无限重复囚徒困境博弈及其变体，其中合作偏好具有异质性，且战略风险源于对对手偏好的不完全信息。我们的模型在多种情境下生成丰富的比较静态预测。研究表明，与标准理论及其他现有模型不同，我们的方法能够系统性地解释包括我们新实验在内的一系列实验结果。