Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
驱逐的社会空间理论
A spatial theory of ostracism
摘要
We investigate a variant of the Hotelling–Downs model where at least two politicians choose their policies in a general policy space under ostracism with each voter voting for the least preferred politician and the politician with the most votes being expelled. We show that if there are at least three politicians, or if the policy space is an inner product space and the support of the distribution of voters’ ideal policies is connected, it is necessary and sufficient for a Nash equilibrium that every politician chooses the same policy in a certain set. Furthermore, we show that under mild assumptions, there exists a Nash equilibrium for a sufficiently large population of politicians.
中文摘要
我们研究了一个Hotelling–Downs模型的变体，在该模型中，至少两位政治家在一般政策空间内，在放逐制度下选择其政策，每位选民投票给最不偏好的政治家，得票最多的政治家被驱逐。我们证明，如果政治家数量至少为三位，或者政策空间为内积空间且选民理想政策分布的支持集是连通的，那么每位政治家都选择某一特定集合中的相同政策，是纳什均衡的必要且充分条件。此外，我们证明在温和假设下，对于足够大的政治家群体，存在纳什均衡。