Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
集成灵活规则的稳定且防策略的可控学校选择机制
A stable and strategy-proof controlled school choice mechanism with integrated and flexible rules
摘要
We examine a controlled school choice model in which students are divided into types and the distribution of admitted students influences schools’ priority structures. We introduce a general class of priority rules that represent priorities as weak orders (allowing ties) for each given assignment and satisfy three axioms: Preference for Diversity, Within-Type Ordering, and Distributional Consistency. This framework includes the adjusted scoring rule, which flexibly integrates reserves, quotas, and bonus-point rules while accounting for uncertainty in applicants’ types and scores. From such priority profiles, we construct choice functions that satisfy substitutability and size monotonicity. We show that the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with these functions yields matchings that are stable with respect to the original priority profiles and satisfy group strategy-proofness. Moreover, when priority profiles are restricted to linear orders for each given assignment, our mechanism yields a student-optimal stable matching.
中文摘要
我们研究了一个受控学校选择模型，其中学生被划分为不同类型，且录取学生的分布会影响学校的优先结构。我们引入了一类通用的优先规则，这些规则将优先权表示为针对每个给定分配的弱序（允许并列），并满足三个公理：多样性偏好、类型内排序和分布一致性。该框架包括调整后的评分规则，该规则灵活整合了预留名额、配额和加分规则，同时考虑了申请者类型和分数的不确定性。基于此类优先概况，我们构建了满足可替代性和规模单调性的选择函数。我们证明，采用这些函数的学生提议延迟接受机制能够产生相对于原始优先概况稳定的匹配，并满足群体策略证明性。此外，当优先概况被限制为每个给定分配的线性序时，我们的机制能够产生学生最优的稳定匹配。