Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
收购、创新与垄断地位的固化
Acquisitions, Innovation and the Entrenchment of Monopoly
摘要
We analyze a dynamic model of repeated innovation where inventors may either be acquired by an incumbent or else resist takeover and challenge for leadership. In the short run, acquisitions always spur innovation because of the invention-for-buyout effect. In the longer run, however, they may stifle it because of a countervailing effect, the entrenchment of monopoly. The latter occurs when the incumbent's dominance depends on past levels of activity and is therefore reinforced by recurrent acquisitions. We show that if the entrenchment effect is sufficiently strong, forward-looking policymakers should prohibit acquisitions in anticipation of the long-run negative impact on innovation. This argument sets out a new theory of harm that can be used to block acquisitions that could otherwise go unchallenged.
中文摘要
我们分析了一个重复创新的动态模型，其中发明者可能被现有企业收购，或者抵制收购并挑战领导地位。短期内，收购总能通过“发明-购买”效应刺激创新。然而，从长远来看，由于一种抵消效应——垄断的固化，收购可能会抑制创新。当现有企业的支配地位依赖于过去的活跃水平，并因此被反复收购所强化时，就会出现这种固化效应。我们证明，如果固化效应足够强，前瞻性的政策制定者应预见收购对创新的长期负面影响而予以禁止。这一论点提出了一种新的损害理论，可用于阻止那些否则可能不受质疑的收购。