Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
逆向选择与小企业融资
Adverse selection and small business finances
摘要
This paper develops a competitive search model with asymmetric information and argues that small firms hold liquid assets not only to self-finance their investments but also to signal their investment quality, thereby obtaining better loan terms. Because self-finance is an outside option of borrowing, it affects bank loans and the credit market structure. Monetary policy affects the cost of self-finance and hence affects the market structure and the screening regimes in the credit market. An increase in the policy rate can trigger banks to use screening contracts, which distort allocations. Using U.S. data, I document that dispersion in firms’ cash-to-asset ratios is hump-shaped in policy rates, consistent with the model’s prediction that firms use liquidity holdings to signal.
中文摘要
本文构建了一个包含信息不对称的竞争性搜索模型，并论证小企业持有流动资产不仅是为了自我融资其投资，也是为了传递其投资质量的信号，从而获得更优的贷款条件。由于自我融资是借款的外部选择，它影响银行贷款和信贷市场结构。货币政策影响自我融资的成本，进而影响信贷市场的市场结构和筛选机制。政策利率的上升可能促使银行采用筛选合同，这会扭曲资源配置。利用美国数据，我记录了企业现金资产比率的离散度在政策利率上呈驼峰形分布，这与模型预测的企业利用流动性持有进行信号传递相一致。