Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
代理定价与议价：来自电子书市场的证据
Agency Pricing and Bargaining: Evidence from the E-Book Market
摘要
This paper studies the pricing implications of wholesale and agency contracts when input terms are determined through bargaining. We develop a structural Nash-in-Nash bargaining model and show that the distribution of bargaining power determines whether agency contracts raise or lower retail prices relative to wholesale contracts. We apply the model to the e-book market, which transitioned from wholesale to agency contracts after the expiration of a ban on agency contracting. Estimates indicate that the retailers have most of the bargaining power. Counterfactual simulations show that most-favored-nation clauses raise prices but would lower the profits of the publishers and Amazon. (JEL C78, D86, K21, L14, L42, L81, L82)
中文摘要
本文研究了当投入条款通过谈判确定时，批发合同与代理合同对定价的影响。我们构建了一个结构化的纳什-纳什谈判模型，并证明谈判力的分布决定了代理合同相对于批发合同是提高还是降低零售价格。我们将该模型应用于电子书市场，该市场在代理合同禁令到期后从批发合同转向代理合同。估计结果表明，零售商拥有大部分谈判力。反事实模拟显示，最惠国待遇条款会提高价格，但会降低出版商和亚马逊的利润。（JEL C78, D86, K21, L14, L42, L81, L82）