Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
教义悖论下的议程操纵
Agenda manipulation under doctrinal paradox
摘要
We study the aggregation of individuals’ beliefs into their collective judgment on a certain proposition, called the conclusion , which is logically related to other preliminary propositions. While the literature has highlighted the crucial dependency of voting outcomes on the selection of an agenda —i.e., the set of propositions voted on—the structure of this dependency is not well understood. We introduce two novel premise-based rules, defined through the conjunctive normal form and disjunctive normal form of the conclusion. Our theorem shows that for any profile of voters’ beliefs, these rules respectively yield the highest and lowest voting outcomes, with respect to a given total order over the set of truth values, within the class of all premise-based rules. This result clarifies the extent to which a voting outcome can be manipulated through the selection of an agenda. Similar content being viewed by others
中文摘要
本文研究个体信念如何聚合为对某一命题（称为“结论”）的集体判断，该结论与其他前提性命题存在逻辑关联。现有文献虽已强调投票结果对议程（即被投票的命题集合）选择的关键依赖性，但这一依赖关系的结构尚未得到充分理解。我们引入两种基于前提的新规则，分别通过结论的合取范式与析取范式进行定义。定理表明：对于任意选民信念分布，在给定真值集合的全序关系下，这两类规则分别在所有基于前提的规则中产生最高与最低的投票结果。该结论揭示了通过议程选择操纵投票结果的可能边界。