Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
并行竞赛的算法分析
An algorithmic analysis of parallel contests
摘要
We consider two-stage parallel contests with a finite set of agents, as well as a finite set of heterogeneous contests with varying winning prizes. In the first stage, each agent simultaneously chooses in which contest he wants to compete, and in the second stage, the agents who chose the same contest compete against each other in a contest for a single prize. We first assume a general Tullock contest success function with nonlinear cost functions, and then we present an algorithm that converges to equilibrium, namely, the algorithm organizes the allocation of homogeneous or heterogeneous agents of two types, each with a different cost of effort, among the contests until no agent wishes to change his current contest. Later, we assume the Tullock contest success function with linear cost functions, and we show that for homogeneous agents, our model and a potential game are equivalent, allowing us to explicitly characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium with pure strategies.
中文摘要
我们考虑一个包含有限数量参与者的两阶段并行竞赛模型，以及一系列奖品各异的异质性竞赛。在第一阶段，每位参与者同时选择想要参加的竞赛；在第二阶段，选择同一竞赛的参与者们为争夺单一奖品而相互竞争。我们首先假设采用具有非线性成本函数的通用Tullock竞赛成功函数，随后提出一种收敛至均衡的算法，即该算法组织同质或异质的两类参与者（每类具有不同的努力成本）在竞赛间进行分配，直至没有参与者希望更换其当前竞赛。接着，我们假设采用具有线性成本函数的Tullock竞赛成功函数，并证明对于同质参与者，我们的模型与一个势博弈等价，从而能够明确刻画纯策略下的子博弈完美均衡。