Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
多期选美竞赛博弈实验研究
An experiment on a multi-period beauty contest game
摘要
We present and conduct a novel experiment on a multi-period beauty contest game. Leveraging the multi-period feature, we investigate how participants revise their forecasts in periods when new information—such as shocks or announcements—arrives and how they form their expectations in the absence of new information. We make two key contributions. First, we develop a new method based on forecast revisions to evaluate whether participants behave in a forward-looking manner. The experimental results show that participants do react to anticipated shocks: namely, the announcements of future shocks. Second, we identify a new strategic environment effect during periods without new information; only when the game exhibits strategic complementarity do participants use extrapolation and expect continuously rising prices. This finding suggests that expectation formation is endogenous to the economic environment; and policy design should thus take this endogeneity into account.
中文摘要
我们设计并开展了一项关于多期选美比赛博弈的新实验。利用多期特征，我们研究了参与者在信息更新时期（如冲击或公告发布时）如何修正其预测，以及在缺乏新信息时如何形成预期。本研究有两项核心贡献：第一，我们基于预测修正开发了一种新方法，用以评估参与者是否具有前瞻性行为。实验结果表明，参与者确实会对预期冲击（即未来冲击的公告）做出反应；第二，我们发现在无新信息时期存在一种新的战略环境效应——只有当博弈呈现战略互补性时，参与者才会采用外推法并预期价格持续上涨。这一发现表明，预期形成内生于经济环境，因此政策设计应考虑这种内生性。