Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
重复古诺寡头垄断强对称均衡中的异常现象
Anomalies in strongly symmetric equilibria of repeated Cournot oligopolies
摘要
We examine strongly symmetric equilibrium (SSE) payoff sets in a general repeated Cournot oligopoly. In a seminal paper, Abreu (1986) shows that the entire set of SSE payoffs can be constructed through simple two-phase (“stick-and-carrot”) punishment paths. However, we find that for many commonly used demand functions, the resulting SSE payoff set can be non-convex, and the quantities and payoffs associated with the best and worst SSEs can exhibit discontinuities in the discount factor. To resolve these issues, we propose regularity conditions that prevent such anomalies in SSE payoffs. Beyond our baseline model, we demonstrate that similar anomalies also arise in other important applications of Abreu’s optimal symmetric punishments in the literature. Our findings highlight the need for caution when applying stick-and-carrot punishments in collusion analysis across different scenarios.
中文摘要
我们考察一般重复古诺寡头博弈中的强对称均衡（SSE）收益集。在一篇开创性论文中，Abreu（1986）表明，整个SSE收益集可以通过简单的两阶段（“大棒—胡萝卜”）惩罚路径构造出来。然而，我们发现，对于许多常用的需求函数，由此得到的SSE收益集可能是非凸的，并且与最优和最差SSE相关的产量和收益在贴现因子中可能表现出不连续性。为解决这些问题，我们提出了一些正则性条件，以防止SSE收益中出现此类异常。在基准模型之外，我们进一步表明，在文献中Abreu最优对称惩罚的其他重要应用中，类似的异常也会出现。我们的发现凸显出，在不同情形下将大棒—胡萝卜惩罚应用于合谋分析时需要谨慎。