Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
具有容量限制中间人的指派市场：核与竞争均衡
Assignment markets with capacitated middlemen: core and competitive equilibria
摘要
We consider a three-sided market where each buyer-seller pair can attain a profit only if there is a middleman that connects them. This profit does not depend on the identity of the middlemen, and each buyer and seller can take part in at most one partnership while middlemen can establish multiple partnerships, up to their capacity. We show that the core is non-empty and strictly contains the set of competitive equilibrium payoff vectors that coincides with the set of solutions of the dual q -assignment problem, where q is the total capacity of the middlemen.
中文摘要
我们考察一个三边市场，其中每对买卖双方只有在存在中间人连接时才能获得利润。该利润不依赖于中间人的身份，且每位买方和卖方最多只能参与一项合作关系，而中间人则可建立多项合作关系，直至其容量上限。我们证明，核心非空，并严格包含竞争均衡支付向量集合，该集合与对偶q-分配问题的解集一致，其中q为中间人的总容量。