审计独立性与年末政府支出激增：来自中国的证据

摘要

The issue of year-end spending surges is a persistent challenge in modern budgetary systems, often resulting in non-standard use of fiscal resources and inefficient budget execution. Our paper examines the role of audit institutions in mitigating end-of-year government spending surges. Using monthly fiscal data for Chinese prefecture-level cities from 2010 to 2019 and examining the effects of vertical management reform of audit agencies using a difference-in-differences design, we find that enhanced audit independence significantly curbs year-end spending surges at the local government level. More independent audit bodies increased attention to delayed fund allocation and year-end spending surges. This change was accompanied by stronger detection of fiscal irregularities, penalties, and referrals to judicial or disciplinary authorities. Moreover, the reform also increased the shares of expenditure executed in the first three quarters, indicating a reallocation of expenditure toward earlier periods. The dampening effects are more pronounced in settings where delays in budget execution are more difficult to monitor and alternative forms of fiscal oversight are weaker. Further evidence suggests that local governments subject to more independent audit oversight achieve higher fiscal expenditure efficiency. These findings highlight the previously underexplored role of audit agency independence in governing end-of-year spending behavior.