Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
不良非政府组织？捐赠市场竞争与员工不当行为
Bad NGOs? Competition in the Market for Donations and Workers' Misconduct
摘要
In this paper, we investigate how competition among NGOs to attract donations shapes the incentives that NGOs provide to their employees. NGOs hire workers to undertake development projects, which are horizontally and vertically differentiated. Workers perform constructive activities that enhance project quality, but can also engage in non‐observable destructive activities that harm the employing organization. NGOs offer monetary incentives to encourage constructive effort, but also need monitoring to curb destructive behavior. Our analysis yields the following results: (i) a high mission orientation on the part of NGOs makes workers' misconduct harder to eliminate; (ii) increased competition in the market for donations leads to higher constructive effort and project quality, but also to greater destructive effort; (iii) relative to the social optimum, the market outcome entails inadequate monitoring and excessive destructive behavior.
中文摘要
本文研究了非政府组织（NGO）在吸引捐款的竞争如何影响其向员工提供的激励措施。NGO雇佣工人开展发展项目，这些项目在横向和纵向维度上存在差异。工人从事提升项目质量的建设性活动，但也可能进行损害雇佣组织的不可观测的破坏性活动。NGO通过货币激励鼓励建设性努力，同时需要监督机制遏制破坏性行为。分析得出以下结论：（i）NGO的高使命导向使员工不当行为更难以消除；（ii）捐款市场竞争加剧会提升建设性努力和项目质量，但也会增加破坏性行为；（iii）与社会最优水平相比，市场均衡结果表现为监督不足和过度破坏性行为。