Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
带在职搜寻的模型中含再谈判的讨价还价
Bargaining with renegotiation in models with on-the-job search
摘要
I present an on-the-job search model with bargaining and renegotiation in which turnover depends on the contracted wage. There is a unique monotone Markov equilibrium. The model encompasses elements of dynamic monopsony and rent sharing. Firms benefit from the reduced turnover associated with a higher wage and workers extract rents due to their bargaining power. Shorter wage contracts reduce the response of turnover to the contracted wage, reducing a firm’s willingness to increase pay, and thereby the worker’s equilibrium share of the match surplus. As renegotiation becomes continuous, linear surplus sharing is obtained. The model further generates spillover effects from minimum wages due to firms’ incentives to increase contracted wages to reduce turnover. These incentives, and therefore the spillovers, are weaker when wage contracts are shorter. Finally, I endogenize the frequency of renegotiation, and find that, generically, the equilibrium features infrequently renegotiated wages.
中文摘要
我构建了一个包含议价与重新谈判的在职搜寻模型，其中员工流动取决于合同工资。存在唯一的单调马尔可夫均衡。该模型融合了动态买方垄断与租金分享的要素。企业因较高工资带来的员工流动减少而获益，工人则凭借其议价能力获取租金。较短的工资合同会降低员工流动对合同工资的响应，从而削弱企业提高工资的意愿，进而减少工人在匹配盈余中的均衡份额。当重新谈判变得连续时，可实现线性盈余分享。模型进一步揭示了最低工资的溢出效应，其源于企业为减少员工流动而提高合同工资的激励。当工资合同较短时，这种激励及其相应的溢出效应会减弱。最后，我将重新谈判频率内生化，并发现一般而言，均衡特征表现为工资重新谈判不频繁。