Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
博弈中的贝叶斯联盟理性：一个信息基础
Bayesian Coalitional Rationality in Games: An Informational Foundation
摘要
The rational behavior of a coalition requires the informational precondition that its members take into account the behavior and beliefs of others. In noncooperative games, we define Bayesian coalitional rationality as a mode of collective behavior that no coalition of players wishes to change, in the sense that there is no coalition-wise common belief that mutual gains can be achieved through a tacit coalitional agreement. We establish a fundamental possibility result: the assumption of Bayesian coalitional rationality and common belief of Bayesian coalitional rationality is attainable in a finite model. Under a belief-richness condition, this assumption characterizes the solution concept of Bayesian coalitional rationalizability. Our approach also provides a novel notion of individual rationality in game situations where players may be uncertain about their own types and strategy choices.
中文摘要
联盟的理性行为要求一个信息前提，即其成员需考虑他人的行为与信念。在非合作博弈中，我们将贝叶斯联盟理性定义为一种集体行为模式，即任何玩家联盟都不希望改变现状，其含义在于不存在联盟层面的共同信念，认为通过默契的联盟协议可以实现相互增益。我们确立了一个基本可能性结果：贝叶斯联盟理性及对其的共同信念假设在有限模型中是可实现的。在信念丰富性条件下，这一假设刻画了贝叶斯联盟理性化的解概念。我们的方法还为玩家可能对自身类型和策略选择不确定的博弈情境提供了一种新颖的个体理性概念。