Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
单边成本不确定下的伯特兰竞争
Bertrand competition with one-sided cost uncertainty
摘要
This paper examines a Bertrand duopoly with homogeneous products and one-sided cost uncertainty. We characterize the undominated equilibria which yield the unique equilibrium payoffs. This uniqueness result could be applied to many important market situations. In particular, we apply our results to examine cost-reducing R&D by an entrant firm that enters a monopolistic market. While significant cost-reducing investments can result in a low marginal cost of production, we show that it may be optimal for the entrant to induce some technological uncertainty by restraining its investment level within certain limits as a means to ease any potential intense competition resulting from such investments.
中文摘要
本文研究了一个同质产品且存在单边成本不确定性的伯特兰双寡头市场。我们刻画了无支配均衡，这些均衡产生了唯一的均衡收益。这一唯一性结果可应用于许多重要的市场情境。特别地，我们将结果应用于考察进入垄断市场的企业进行降低成本研发的情形。尽管显著的降本投资可能导致较低的生产边际成本，但我们表明，进入者可能最优地通过将投资水平限制在一定范围内来引发某种技术不确定性，以此缓解此类投资可能带来的激烈竞争。