Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
公共物品的竞标
Bidding for public goods
摘要
We introduce public-good auctions, a versatile framework addressing auction scenarios where players benefit not only from winning themselves but also when their competitors win. Distinct from private-good auctions, public-good auctions feature prizes as public goods enjoyed by all players and allow them to choose from multiple prizes. Demonstrating broad applicability, public-good auctions can be applied to various economic models, including auctions with externalities, and combinatorial auctions. The framework effectively explains unconventional situations marked by conflicting incentives between cooperation and competition and diverse behaviors, such as free-riding, cooperation, strategic voting, and multiple targeting, which are unobserved in traditional auction settings. Using a two-player model, we present four main results regarding the existence, characterization, and uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs.
中文摘要
我们引入公共品拍卖这一通用框架，用以处理拍卖场景中玩家不仅从自身获胜中获益，还从竞争对手获胜中获益的情形。与私人物品拍卖不同，公共品拍卖的特点在于奖品作为公共品为所有玩家所共享，且玩家可选择多个奖品。该框架展现出广泛的适用性，可应用于多种经济模型，包括具有外部性的拍卖和组合拍卖。此框架有效解释了传统拍卖环境中未观察到的、以合作与竞争之间激励冲突为标志的非常规情境及多样化行为，如搭便车、合作、策略性投票和多重目标设定。通过一个双玩家模型，我们提出了关于均衡收益的存在性、特征化及唯一性的四项主要结果。