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Breaking Bad News

Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Simon Board

来源
American Economic Review: Insights · 期刊论文
本站首次发现
2026-06-15 19:46
日期信息
Crossref 元数据日期 2026-06-01 · 来源:Crossref
主题
发展经济学

摘要

We study how information disclosure shapes social learning about a potentially harmful product. Increased transparency helps early agents avoid harm, which may undermine learning by later agents. Despite this conflict of interest, we show that full transparency is uniquely optimal for all agents when they learn only by observing neighbors’ harm. We investigate whether full transparency about harm continues to benefit all agents when they also learn from additional, imperfect signals. (JEL D18, D82, D83, L15)

中文摘要

我们研究信息披露如何影响关于潜在有害产品的社会学习。提高透明度有助于早期行动者避免伤害,但这可能削弱后期行动者的学习效果。尽管存在这种利益冲突,我们证明当行动者仅通过观察邻居的伤害进行学习时,完全透明度对所有行动者而言是唯一最优的。我们进一步探究,当行动者还从其他不完美信号中学习时,关于伤害的完全透明度是否仍能使所有行动者受益。(JEL D18, D82, D83, L15)