Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
连续强度下的买方隐藏搜索：卖方最优机制与一种反常效应
Buyer's Hidden Search With Continuous Intensity: The Seller‐Optimal Mechanism and a Perverse Effect
摘要
We adopt a dynamic mechanism design approach to study how a revenue‐maximizing seller should sell an indivisible object when a buyer with a private value can search for an outside option with continuous‐intensity choices. We find that lowering the buyer's search cost definitely reduces the seller's revenue when the buyer's search decision is binary, as in Armstrong and Zhou (2016). In contrast, with continuous search intensity, a counterintuitive effect may arise: lowering the buyer's search cost function can, under mild conditions, actually increase the seller's revenue.
中文摘要
我们采用动态机制设计方法，研究当具有私人价值的买方能够通过连续强度选择搜索外部选项时，追求收益最大化的卖方应如何销售不可分割商品。研究发现，当买方搜索决策为二元选择时（如Armstrong与Zhou 2016年所述），降低买方搜索成本必然减少卖方收益。然而在连续搜索强度下，可能产生反直觉效应：在温和条件下，降低买方搜索成本函数反而可能增加卖方收益。