Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
买方验证与内生质量
Buyer Verification and Endogenous Quality
摘要
We study a bilateral trade setting where a seller privately chooses quality, and a buyer may pay to verify it. We show that information acquisition by the buyer can give rise to an informational hold-up problem: when verification produces precise information, the seller shades quality, stripping the marginal buyer of surplus, causing trade to unravel. Trade survives only when verification is noisy enough to leave the buyer with residual surplus, yet precise enough to discipline the seller. The hold-up mechanism persists under buyer heterogeneity, noise in production, convex costs, and endogenous pricing.
中文摘要
我们研究一个双边贸易环境，其中卖方私下选择质量，而买方可以付费验证质量。我们表明，买方的信息获取可能引发信息性套牢问题：当验证产生精确信息时，卖方会降低质量，剥夺边际买方的剩余，导致贸易瓦解。只有当验证噪声足够大，使买方保留剩余，同时又足够精确以约束卖方时，贸易才能存续。该套牢机制在买方异质性、生产噪声、凸成本以及内生定价下依然存在。