Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
你能保守秘密吗？禁止竞业限制并不会增加商业秘密诉讼。
Can you keep a secret? Banning noncompetes does not increase trade secret litigation
摘要
As bans on noncompete agreements (NCAs) become more common, commentators increasingly argue that trade secret litigation will rise. The logic is straightforward: banning NCAs increases worker mobility, creating more opportunities for trade secret misappropriation and litigation. We test this claim using state-level NCA bans for high- and low-wage workers and data on trade secret filings from Westlaw and Courthouse News Service. Contrary to this prediction, we find that trade secret filings decline in the long run following NCA bans, even as worker mobility increases. This decline is not driven by fewer cases combining NCA and trade secret claims or by reduced reliance on trade secrecy. Firms appear to rely more heavily on trade secrets after NCA bans. Finally, we find that adoption of the inevitable disclosure doctrine increases both NCA and trade secret claims. These findings suggest that NCA and trade secret litigation are complementary protections for valuable firm knowledge.
中文摘要
随着对竞业禁止协议（NCAs）的禁令日益普遍，评论者越来越多地认为商业秘密诉讼将会增加。其逻辑很直接：禁止NCAs提高了劳动者流动性，为商业秘密侵占和诉讼创造了更多机会。我们利用针对高工资和低工资劳动者的州级NCA禁令，以及来自Westlaw和Courthouse News Service的商业秘密立案数据，检验了这一主张。与上述预测相反，我们发现，在NCA禁令之后，商业秘密立案在长期内下降，即便劳动者流动性上升。这种下降并非由同时包含NCA与商业秘密主张的案件减少，或对商业秘密保护的依赖降低所驱动。企业在NCA禁令后似乎更加依赖商业秘密。最后，我们发现，采纳不可避免披露原则会增加NCA和商业秘密主张。这些发现表明，NCA诉讼与商业秘密诉讼是企业有价值知识的互补性保护。