Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
赌场旅游、外部性与最优税收政策：一般均衡框架
Casino tourism, externalities, and optimal tax policy: A general equilibrium framework
摘要
This paper develops a general equilibrium model to examine the optimal taxation of casino gaming in the presence of both positive and negative externalities associated with casino tourism. The framework integrates tourists' utility maximization, casinos' profit maximization, and policymakers' tax-setting decisions to determine the welfare-maximizing gaming tax. The model is sufficiently general to analyze casino-based tourism destinations with different institutional settings, including Las Vegas, Macau, and Osaka. The analysis shows that the optimal gaming tax decreases as casino entry is restricted and as positive spillovers from casino tourism to other local industries are increased. Conversely, higher social costs associated with casino gaming and greater gaming reliance on non-local tourist demand justify higher tax rates. The model provides a unified framework for evaluating the trade-offs between the economic benefits of casino tourism and its social costs, offering policy guidance for the efficient design of gaming taxation across tourism destinations.
中文摘要
本文构建了一个一般均衡模型，在赌场旅游同时带来正外部性和负外部性的情形下，考察赌场博彩的最优税收问题。该框架整合了游客的效用最大化、赌场的利润最大化以及政策制定者的税率设定决策，以确定使福利最大化的博彩税。该模型具有足够的一般性，可用于分析具有不同制度环境的赌场旅游目的地，包括拉斯维加斯、澳门和大阪。分析表明，随着赌场进入受到限制以及赌场旅游对其他本地产业的正向溢出效应增加，最优博彩税会下降。相反，与赌场博彩相关的社会成本越高，以及博彩对非本地游客需求的依赖程度越大，就越是支持较高的税率。该模型为评估赌场旅游的经济收益与其社会成本之间的权衡提供了一个统一框架，并为各旅游目的地高效设计博彩税收提供了政策指导。