Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
选择知之更少：需求冲击下纵向市场中的策略性无知作为承诺机制
Choosing to Know Less: Strategic Ignorance as a Commitment Device in Vertical Markets with Demand Shocks
摘要
This paper examines how a retailer's strategic decision to remain uninformed about market demand can influence outcomes in vertical markets. Rather than treating information acquisition as a straightforward cost‐benefit calculation, we show that staying deliberately ignorant may serve as a strategic commitment device that softens upstream pricing and deters inefficient direct market entry. In a setting where a manufacturer can choose to open a direct sales channel, we find that the retailer's information strategy – whether to acquire demand information, remain uninformed, or share acquired information – can substantially impact the channel structure, wholesale pricing, and total supply chain profit. Notably, the retailer's optimal information acquisition decision is non‐monotonic in the expected market potential. Strategic ignorance can deter inefficient manufacturers from entering the market, while information sharing may serve as an anti‐competitive device when demand is sufficiently high. These findings illustrate how strategic choices regarding information acquisition can alter market structures and create new opportunities for supply chain coordination.
中文摘要
本文考察零售商策略性地选择对市场需求保持不知情如何影响纵向市场中的结果。本文不将信息获取视为简单的成本—收益计算，而是表明，刻意保持无知可能作为一种策略性承诺机制，软化上游定价并阻止低效率的直接市场进入。在制造商可以选择开设直销渠道的设定中，我们发现零售商的信息策略——无论是获取需求信息、保持不知情，还是分享已获取的信息——都可能显著影响渠道结构、批发定价和供应链总利润。值得注意的是，零售商的最优信息获取决策对预期市场潜力呈非单调关系。策略性无知可以阻止低效率制造商进入市场，而当需求足够高时，信息分享可能作为一种反竞争机制发挥作用。这些发现说明了关于信息获取的策略性选择如何改变市场结构，并为供应链协调创造新的机会。