Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
条款与效应：关于竞业禁止条款的理论与实地实验证据
Clause and Effect: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence on Noncompete Clauses
摘要
We study worker noncompete clauses in a large field experiment with two finance firms. Across ~14,000 job offers to freelance recruiters on short-term contracts, we randomize wages and the presence, salience, and duration of noncompetes (all contracts also included a nondisclosure agreement). Removing a noncompete increases mobility between competing employers by 36–52% and raises workers’ total earnings from the two firms by 12–17%. We find no evidence—rejecting even small effects—that removing noncompetes generates secret leakage. We also find no evidence that workers choose noncompete jobs for higher pay. Many workers appear unaware of noncompetes before firms’ post-employment communication. The results align with a model of inattention and uncertainty about enforcement.
中文摘要
我们在两家金融公司开展的大规模实地实验中研究了工人的竞业禁止条款。在向短期合同自由招聘人员发出的约14,000份工作邀请中，我们随机化了工资以及竞业禁止条款的存在性、显著性和持续时间（所有合同均包含保密协议）。移除竞业禁止条款使竞争雇主之间的流动性提高了36%-52%，并使工人在两家公司的总收益增加了12%-17%。我们没有发现任何证据——甚至拒绝了微小效应的存在——表明移除竞业禁止条款会导致秘密泄露。我们也没有发现工人为了更高薪酬而选择竞业禁止工作的证据。许多工人似乎在公司的雇佣后沟通之前对竞业禁止条款并不知情。这些结果与关于注意力不足和执行不确定性的模型相吻合。