Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
学校选择中的联盟可操纵性
Coalitional manipulability in school choice
摘要
We compare the degree of coalitional manipulability across stable school‐choice mechanisms. Although no stable mechanism is group strategy‐proof for all school choice contexts, we show that the student‐optimal stable mechanism is the least manipulable by coalitions, whereas the school‐optimal stable mechanism is the most coalitionally manipulable. These results still hold when students can only report truncated preferences, when the set of coalitions is limited, or when schools cannot be declared unacceptable as long as there are more available seats than students. In contrast, if there is a shortage of seats and students have no outside options, the school‐optimal stable mechanism can be less manipulable by coalitions than the student‐optimal stable mechanism.
中文摘要
我们比较了不同稳定学校选择机制中联盟可操纵性的程度。尽管在所有的学校选择情境中，没有一种稳定机制是群体策略证明的，但我们发现，学生最优稳定机制是联盟可操纵性最低的，而学校最优稳定机制则是联盟可操纵性最高的。这些结果在学生只能报告截断偏好、联盟集合受到限制，或者当可用名额多于学生数量时学校不能被宣布为不可接受的情况下仍然成立。相反，如果名额短缺且学生没有外部选择，学校最优稳定机制的联盟可操纵性可能低于学生最优稳定机制。