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科斯式利益相关者理论
Coasian Stakeholder Theory
摘要
Stakeholder theory asks who is in, who is out, and who gets what. Existing work illuminates important dimensions of firm–stakeholder relationships but does not supply a common, transaction-level rule connecting these questions. We use the Coase theorem to develop such a rule. A Coasian stakeholder is an actor with shutdown power, defined as the de facto capacity, within the relevant time horizon, to prevent, materially delay, or substantially reduce the expected joint value of a focal value-creating transaction. If all such actors are identified and bargaining and enforcement are costless, value-maximizing transactions proceed, although rights and bargaining positions may affect who captures value. When transaction costs are positive, however, identification, bargaining, coalition formation, and enforcement can delay, distort, or suppress those transactions. Across six propositions, we explain how shutdown power is identified and acquired, how complementarity and bargaining conditions shape value capture, how firms reshape stakeholder sets through coalition costs and governance design, and why consolidated opposition can sometimes preserve transactions that fragmented claims would suppress.
中文摘要
利益相关者理论追问谁在内、谁在外以及谁获得什么。现有研究揭示了企业—利益相关者关系的重要维度，但并未提供一条连接这些问题的、共同的交易层面规则。我们运用科斯定理来发展这样一条规则。科斯式利益相关者是拥有停摆权力的行为主体，停摆权力被定义为在相关时间范围内，阻止、实质性延迟或大幅降低某一焦点价值创造交易的预期联合价值的事实能力。如果所有此类行为主体都被识别出来，且讨价还价与执行均无成本，则价值最大化的交易会继续进行，尽管权利和讨价还价地位可能影响谁获取价值。然而，当交易成本为正时，识别、讨价还价、联盟形成和执行可能延迟、扭曲或抑制这些交易。通过六个命题，我们解释了停摆权力如何被识别和获取，互补性与讨价还价条件如何塑造价值获取，企业如何通过联盟成本和治理设计重塑利益相关者集合，以及为什么联合反对有时能够保全那些碎片化主张会抑制的交易。