Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
通过债务与经理人合谋
Collusion through debt and managers
摘要
We investigate the anticompetitive effects of debt financing and managerial incentives in the presence of managers incurring personal bankruptcy costs. We characterize the strategic value for firms' shareholders of resorting to debt and managerial incentives as complementary devices to sustain collusion among firms, when managerial bankruptcy costs are sufficiently responsive to the severity of financial distress. The shareholders' inability to commit to debt and managerial contracts implies that common lending to different firms constitutes a key driver for collusion. These results square with the well‐documented empirical evidence on debt financing, managerial incentives, and common lending in sectors plagued by collusion.
中文摘要
我们探讨了在管理者承担个人破产成本的情况下，债务融资与管理者激励的反竞争效应。当管理者破产成本对财务困境的严重程度反应足够敏感时，我们刻画了企业股东将债务与管理者激励作为互补工具以维持企业间合谋的战略价值。股东无法承诺债务及管理者契约，意味着对不同企业的共同贷款成为合谋的关键驱动因素。这些结果与关于债务融资、管理者激励及受合谋困扰行业中共同贷款的广泛实证证据相吻合。