Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
单位需求与学习效应下的服务市场竞争
Competition on service markets with unit demand and learning
摘要
We analyze competition in service markets with unit demand prone to adverse selection, such as secured lending and car insurance markets. Incumbent firms learn their customers’ types over time and can price discriminate accordingly. We prove existence of a unique set of mixed strategy equilibria where firms randomize prices over a bounded continuous support. Incumbents earn positive rents. Increased competition through firm entry does not benefit customers if firms know portfolio compositions of competitors. If firms only possess information regarding the aggregate industry client composition, horizontal mergers may reduce industry rents, a finding with implications for competition policy in information-intensive industries.
中文摘要
摘要 我们分析了存在逆向选择风险的单元需求服务市场中的竞争，例如担保贷款和汽车保险市场。在位企业会随时间推移了解客户类型，并据此实施价格歧视。我们证明存在一组唯一的混合策略均衡，其中企业在有界连续支撑集上随机定价。在位企业可获得正租金。若企业了解竞争对手的投资组合构成，则通过企业进入加剧竞争并不会使客户受益。若企业仅掌握行业整体客户构成的汇总信息，横向并购可能降低行业租金，这一发现对信息密集型行业的竞争政策具有启示意义。