Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
重复道德风险下的竞争性搜索
Competitive Search with Repeated Moral Hazard
摘要
This paper studies the effects of moral hazard on employment and wage dynamics in a continuous-time competitive search model. Unobservable idiosyncratic factors require employers to design dynamic contracts to incentivize workers to exert effort. A higher level of public aggregate productivity reduces the relative importance of unobservable idiosyncratic factors, which facilitates the detection of shirking and relaxes firms’ incentive constraint. This channel amplifies the elasticity of vacancy to changes in aggregate productivity and induces time-varying schemes in wage compensation. When the informational friction is disciplined by the moment on individual workers’ wage residuals in PSID, the model produces higher unemployment volatility than that without the moral hazard problem. In addition, the model generates endogenous counter-cyclical wage dispersion.
中文摘要
本文研究道德风险对连续时间竞争性搜寻模型中就业与工资动态的影响。不可观测的异质性因素要求雇主设计动态合同以激励工人付出努力。较高的公共总量生产率水平降低了不可观测异质性因素的相对重要性，这有助于识别偷懒行为并放松企业的激励约束。该渠道放大了空缺对总量生产率变化的弹性，并引致工资补偿中的时变机制。当信息摩擦由PSID中个体工人工资残差的矩进行约束时，该模型产生的失业波动高于不存在道德风险问题时的情形。此外，该模型生成了内生的逆周期工资离散。