Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
网络最小博弈中的协调
Coordination in the network minimum game
摘要
Motivated by the problem of organizational design, we study coordination in the network minimum game : a version of the minimum-effort game where players are connected by a directed network. We show experimentally that acyclic networks such as hierarchies are most conducive to successful coordination. Introducing a single link to complete a network cycle may drastically inhibit coordination. Furthermore, acyclic networks enable resilient coordination: initial coordination failure is often overcome (exacerbated) after repeated play in acyclic (cyclic) networks.
中文摘要
受组织设计问题的启发，我们研究了网络最小博弈中的协调问题：该博弈是最小努力博弈的一个变体，其中参与者通过有向网络相互连接。实验结果表明，层级结构等无环网络最有利于实现成功协调。引入单一链接以形成网络环可能会严重抑制协调。此外，无环网络能够实现具有韧性的协调：在无环（有环）网络中，初始协调失败往往会在重复博弈后被克服（加剧）。