Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
科普兰选择规则
Copeland choice rules
摘要
Tournaments are well studied objects in economic theory. Copeland (1951 A reasonable social welfare function. Tech. rep., Mimeo, University of Michigan USA")) provides an intuitive way to select alternatives from a tournament, the Copeland set . As a tournament solution, the Copeland set possesses many desirable properties and has been widely studied. Rubinstein (1980 Ranking the participants in a tournament. SIAM J Appl Math 38:108–111")) axiomatizes a method to rank alternatives from a tournament which is based on their Copeland scores . This paper analyzes the Copeland set from a revealed preference perspective. A choice procedure where a decision maker has a fixed underlying tournament and selects the Copeland set from every menu is behaviorally characterized.
中文摘要
锦标赛是经济理论中研究较为深入的对象。Copeland（1951，《一种合理的社会福利函数》，技术报告，密歇根大学，美国）提出了一种从锦标赛中筛选备选方案的直观方法，即Copeland集。作为一种锦标赛解概念，Copeland集具备诸多理想性质，并得到了广泛研究。Rubinstein（1980，《锦标赛参与者排序方法》，《SIAM应用数学杂志》第38卷，第108–111页）基于Copeland得分公理化了锦标赛备选方案的排序方法。本文从显示偏好视角分析Copeland集。研究对一种选择程序进行了行为特征刻画：在该程序中，决策者拥有固定的潜在锦标赛结构，并从每个备选菜单中选取Copeland集。