Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
低利率环境下的企业养老金风险承担
Corporate Pension Risk-Taking in a Low Interest Rate Environment
摘要
We examine how funding deficit pressures shape the risk-taking of U.S. corporate defined-benefit pension plans and how targeted regulatory relief can mitigate these incentives. Using the 2012 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act reform, which temporarily eased funding pressure by revising discount rate calculations, we show that plans receiving greater relief significantly reduced their equity allocations and shifted toward safer assets. This derisking was most pronounced among active plans and those sponsored by more financially constrained firms. Our findings demonstrate that targeted regulatory relief can curb risk-taking incentives even without altering underlying economic conditions or financial reporting standards and shed light on the likely (and unlikely) frictions driving such behavior. This paper was accepted by Bo Becker, finance. Funding: R. Pinto acknowledges financial support from the Lancaster University Management School Pump Prime Program. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.02928 .
中文摘要
我们考察资金缺口压力如何塑造美国企业固定收益养老金计划的风险承担行为，以及有针对性的监管纾困如何缓解这些激励。利用2012年《21世纪前进法案》改革——该改革通过修订折现率计算暂时缓解了资金压力——我们表明，获得更大纾困的计划显著降低了其股票配置，并转向更安全的资产。这种去风险化在活跃计划以及由财务约束更强的公司发起的计划中最为明显。我们的发现表明，即使不改变基本经济条件或财务报告标准，有针对性的监管纾困也能抑制风险承担激励，并揭示了驱动此类行为的可能（和不太可能）的摩擦。本文由金融学编辑Bo Becker接收。资助：R. Pinto感谢兰卡斯特大学管理学院Pump Prime项目的财务支持。补充材料：在线附录和数据文件可在https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2025.02928获取。