Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
相关完美均衡
Correlated perfect equilibrium
摘要
We propose a refinement of correlated equilibrium based on common perturbations of the mediator’s recommendation distribution, which we call correlated perfect equilibrium (CPE). In finite games, the set of CPEs is nonempty and forms a finite union of convex polyhedra. Like perfect equilibrium, a CPE never assigns positive probability to any weakly dominated strategy. We provide a dual representation of CPE, which yields an iterative procedure for identifying CPEs. These perturbations provide a common source of off-equilibrium beliefs, a feature that distinguishes CPE from two existing refinements of correlated equilibrium—acceptable correlated equilibrium (Myerson, 1986) and perfect direct correlated equilibrium (Dhillon and Mertens, 1996)—as we demonstrate through examples.
中文摘要
我们提出了一种基于中介推荐分布的共同扰动对相关均衡的改进，称为相关完美均衡（CPE）。在有限博弈中，CPE集非空且构成有限个凸多面体的并集。与完美均衡一样，CPE从不为任何弱劣策略赋予正概率。我们给出了CPE的对偶表示，由此得到一种识别CPE的迭代方法。这些扰动为偏离均衡信念提供了一个共同来源，这一特征使CPE区别于相关均衡的两种现有改进——可接受相关均衡（Myerson，1986）和完美直接相关均衡（Dhillon和Mertens，1996）——我们通过例子对此加以说明。