Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
信任品、消费者反馈与（非）效率
Credence Goods, Consumer Feedback and (in)Efficiency
摘要
We study how consumer feedback affects a credence good market where consumers sequentially visit a monopolistic expert. Each consumer's problem can be minor or major. Before treatment, the expert performs a diagnosis which may fail. Each consumer reveals the received treatment and its outcome. Consumers observe feedback history and decide whether to visit the expert. We find that consumer feedback can lead to inefficiency. When diagnosis fails, the expert overtreats consumers even though the probability of a major problem is low. This behavior does not arise without consumer feedback.
中文摘要
我们研究消费者反馈如何影响一个信任品市场，在该市场中，消费者依次访问垄断专家。每位消费者的问题可能是轻微的或严重的。在治疗前，专家进行诊断，但诊断可能失败。每位消费者会透露所接受的治疗及其结果。消费者观察反馈历史并决定是否访问专家。我们发现，消费者反馈可能导致效率低下。当诊断失败时，即使严重问题的概率较低，专家也会过度治疗消费者。这种行为在没有消费者反馈的情况下不会出现。