Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
信用卡交换费再审视：信贷与消费者行为的作用
Credit card interchange fees revisited: The role of credit and consumer behavior
摘要
I revisit the issue of optimal regulation of credit card interchange fees by considering the incentives arising in the credit market. I model credit cards as offering a base payment instrument and an add-on credit product. By connecting the interchange fee and add-on pricing literature, I show that issuers’ per-transaction fees are lower than when no credit is offered, as issuers aim to induce more demand for the credit feature of the cards. Moreover, total welfare now considers the social costs and benefits of different forms of credit. I discuss how these effects influence optimal interchange fee regulation and examine spillovers between credit market regulations and welfare-maximizing interchange fees.
中文摘要
我重新审视信用卡交换费的最优监管问题，通过考虑信贷市场中产生的激励因素。我将信用卡建模为提供基础支付工具和附加信贷产品。通过将交换费与附加定价文献相结合，我证明发卡机构的每笔交易费用低于不提供信贷时的水平，因为发卡机构旨在诱导对信用卡信贷功能的更多需求。此外，总福利现在考虑了不同形式信贷的社会成本与收益。我讨论了这些效应如何影响最优交换费监管，并考察了信贷市场监管与福利最大化交换费之间的溢出效应。