Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
数字服务中的网络（不）安全与互操作性
Cyber(in)security and Interoperability in Digital Services
摘要
This paper investigates the interplay between interoperability and the incentives to invest in cybersecurity in digital markets. We develop a two‐sided symmetric duopoly model in which cyberattacks create a congestion‐like externality, and interoperability amplifies hackers' incentives to target connected platforms. We show that interoperability affects cybersecurity investment through multiple channels, potentially producing a non‐monotonic relationship: Low interoperability promotes risk‐mitigation efforts, whereas high interoperability may discourage investment due to a public good effect. We then compare private and social incentives to adopt interoperability, identifying potential sources of misalignment. Finally, we extend the baseline model to account for additional factors shaping the desirability of interoperability, including platforms' business models, users' awareness of cyber risk, asymmetries in user bases, and the role of alternative compensation schemes.
中文摘要
本文探讨了互操作性如何影响数字市场中网络安全投资的激励。我们构建了一个双边对称双寡头模型，其中网络攻击产生类似拥堵的外部性，而互操作性则增强了黑客针对互联平台的攻击动机。我们证明，互操作性通过多种渠道影响网络安全投资，可能产生非单调关系：低互操作性促进风险缓解努力，而高互操作性可能因公共物品效应抑制投资。随后，我们比较了采用互操作性的私人激励与社会激励，识别出潜在的错位来源。最后，我们将基线模型扩展，以纳入影响互操作性可取性的额外因素，包括平台商业模式、用户对网络风险的认知、用户基础的异质性以及替代补偿方案的作用。