Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
数据可携性与个人数据收集
Data portability and the collection of personal data
摘要
The right to data portability allows consumers to obtain and reuse their personal data across service providers. However, its effect on market competition is not clear-cut, as it impacts the firms’ incentives to collect data. Employing a two-period game-theoretic model in which consumer data collected by one firm in the first period can be transferred to the other firm in the second period, this paper analyzes the implications of data portability on competition and welfare. We find that by eliminating the data “lock-in” effect, data portability mitigates competition during data collection, although intensifying it afterward. Perhaps counterintuitively, the firms collect more data when data is portable. Moreover, they earn higher profits, whereas consumers may well be worse off. We identify the degree of market competition as a critical determinant of the welfare implications of data portability. Specifically, low (high) levels of competition are associated with improved (worsened) overall social welfare.
中文摘要
数据可携权允许消费者在不同服务提供商之间获取并重复使用其个人数据。然而，其对市场竞争的影响并非一目了然，因为它会影响企业收集数据的激励。通过构建一个两期博弈论模型，其中一家企业在第一期收集的消费者数据可在第二期转移给另一家企业，本文分析了数据可携权对竞争和福利的影响。我们发现，通过消除数据“锁定”效应，数据可携权缓解了数据收集阶段的竞争，尽管在后续阶段加剧了竞争。或许与直觉相悖的是，当数据可携时，企业会收集更多数据。此外，企业获得更高利润，而消费者可能反而受损。我们识别出市场竞争程度是决定数据可携权福利影响的关键因素。具体而言，低（高）竞争水平与整体社会福利的改善（恶化）相关联。