Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
截止日期可信度与贸易效率
Deadline credibility and trade efficiency
摘要
Many real-world negotiations are persistently delayed, yet imposing deadlines is costly because it induces inefficient separations. Do all deadlines in one-on-one market transactions need to be perfectly credible? To improve trade efficiency, I propose a mechanism that introduces an intermediate, imperfectly credible deadline to facilitate agreement. Using a canonical seller–buyer dynamic bargaining model with a credible deadline, I analytically characterize the optimal degree of credibility of such a deadline that maximizes trade efficiency, leading to early agreements without triggering separations. Under a non-zero risk of separation, the seller is tempted to discount the price to secure a payoff, while the buyer is more likely to accept at the intermediate deadline because pricing resembles ultimatum offers. A laboratory experiment provides direct evidence of the mechanism’s effects that extend beyond the theoretical benchmark.
中文摘要
许多现实世界中的谈判常常被持续拖延，然而设定截止日期成本高昂，因为它会导致效率低下的分离。一对一市场交易中的所有截止日期是否都必须完全可信？为了提升交易效率，我提出了一种机制，引入一个中间程度的、不完全可信的截止日期来促进协议达成。利用一个带有可信截止日期的经典卖方-买方动态讨价还价模型，我从分析上刻画了此类截止日期的最优可信度，以最大化交易效率，从而在不引发分离的情况下促成早期协议。在存在非零分离风险的情况下，卖方倾向于降低价格以确保收益，而买方则更可能在中间截止日期接受，因为定价类似于最后通牒式报价。一项实验室实验提供了该机制效果的直接证据，这些效果超出了理论基准的预期。