Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
面向价格管制与集中型行业的碳排放交易机制设计：来自中国电力部门的启示
Designing emissions trading schemes for a price-regulated and concentrated industry: Insights from China’s power sector
摘要
This paper proposes a framework for designing an emissions trading system (ETS) for the highly concentrated and regulated Chinese electricity forward markets. We present an economic model where a few generation firms maximize profits by choosing output levels under a price set below equilibrium and engage in trading carbon permits under either tradable performance standards (TPS) or cap-and-trade (C&T) systems. The regulated price causes underproduction across all firms. Compared to a scenario with no ETS, both ETS depress permit buyers’ production, and C&T typically decreases sellers’ production unless initial allocations are excessively high. However, TPS encourages permit sellers’ production if a seller cannot drastically shift the permit market equilibrium. From a Guangdong dataset, we uncover model parameters, such as firm-specific cost functions, and use them to evaluate policy scenarios. We find TPS achieves higher welfare with lower emissions than C&T under the regulated price. If the price is jointly selected with the ETS to maximize welfare, both achieve almost identical welfare and emission levels, but TPS has more consumer surplus than C&T. Moreover, TPS under the regulated price approximates this maximized welfare, counteracting the underproduction by reallocating generation to low-emission-intensity firms, whereas C&T requires substantially higher power and permit prices.
中文摘要
本文提出一个框架，旨在为高度集中且受监管的中国电力远期市场设计排放交易体系（ETS）。我们构建了一个经济模型，其中少数发电企业在低于均衡水平的价格设定下，通过选择产出水平来实现利润最大化，并在可交易绩效标准（TPS）或总量控制与交易（C&T）体系下进行碳配额交易。受监管的价格导致所有企业生产不足。与无ETS情景相比，两种ETS均抑制了配额买方的生产，而C&T通常减少卖方的生产，除非初始分配过高。然而，若卖方无法大幅改变配额市场均衡，TPS则鼓励配额卖方的生产。基于广东数据集，我们揭示了模型参数，如企业特定成本函数，并利用这些参数评估政策情景。我们发现，在受监管价格下，TPS相比C&T能实现更高福利和更低排放。若价格与ETS共同选择以最大化福利，两者在福利和排放水平上几乎相同，但TPS比C&T带来更多消费者剩余。此外，受监管价格下的TPS接近这种最大化福利，通过将发电重新分配给低排放强度企业来抵消生产不足，而C&T则需要显著更高的电力和配额价格。