Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
为缺乏耐心者设计激励措施：一项促进运动管理糖尿病的随机对照试验
Designing Incentives for Impatient People: An RCT Promoting Exercise to Manage Diabetes
摘要
Many people are impatient. We introduce domain-specific discounting to a contracting model and test a prediction for how to make incentives work well when people are im- patient over effort: implement time-bundled contracts that make the payment for future effort increase in current effort. Using a randomized evaluation of an exercise incentive program among diabetics in India, we find that time-bundled contracts generate equiv- alent e ort to time-separable contracts at 15% lower cost. Moreover, they perform 30% better among individuals with above-median effort impatience. Pooled across contracts, incentives increase steps by 20% and improve blood sugar relative to a control group.
中文摘要
许多人缺乏耐心。我们将领域特定贴现引入契约模型，并检验一项关于如何在人们对努力缺乏耐心时有效设计激励措施的预测：实施时间捆绑契约，使未来努力的报酬随当前努力增加而递增。通过对印度糖尿病患者运动激励项目的随机评估，我们发现时间捆绑契约能以比时间可分离契约低15%的成本产生同等努力水平。此外，在努力耐心程度高于中位数的个体中，其效果提升30%。综合各类契约来看，与对照组相比，激励措施使步数增加20%，并改善血糖水平。