Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
检测公共采购中的偏袒行为
Detecting Favoritism in Public Procurement
摘要
Favoritism as a mode of corruption is a major concern in public procurement (PP) in many countries. We propose a regression discontinuity design (RDD) test arguing that the winning history of marginal winners and losers can be used to detect favoritism. We apply the empirical test to PP of cleaning services in Finland and find evidence of favoritism even in this relatively low corruption environment. First, winners of close races in terms of win margin tend to have won more also in the past, which is in contrast to competitive environment. Second, to rule out an alternative explanation of collusion based on incumbency, we show that these winners also tend to submit their bids the last, indicating information sharing about rival bids from the buyer to the favored bidder.
中文摘要
偏袒作为一种腐败形式，是许多国家公共采购（PP）中的主要问题。我们提出了一种断点回归设计（RDD）检验，认为边际获胜者与失败者的获胜历史可用于检测偏袒行为。我们将该实证检验应用于芬兰清洁服务公共采购中，发现即使在腐败程度相对较低的环境中，偏袒现象依然存在。首先，以微弱优势获胜的竞标者（即获胜幅度接近的竞标者）往往在过去也赢得更多合同，这与竞争性环境形成对比。其次，为排除基于在位优势的合谋替代解释，我们证明这些获胜者还倾向于最后提交标书，这表明买方与受偏袒的竞标者之间存在关于竞争对手报价的信息共享。