Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
多阶段拍卖中共谋网络的检测
Detection of Collusive Networks in Multistage Auctions
摘要
We develop a method for detecting cartels in multistage auctions. Our approach allows firms to act collusively against cartel members yet competitively otherwise. In these auctions, bidders submit initial bids and can later revise them downward. As initial bids are shaded, close initial bids indicate similar costs and thus create strong incentives to undercut rivals. We classify firm pairs as collusive if they ignore this incentive by failing to update bids against each other, relative to other pairs with similarly close initial bids. Our algorithm predicts Ukraine’s Antimonopoly Committee sanctions: classified pairs are nine times more likely to be sanctioned.
中文摘要
我们提出了一种在多阶段拍卖中检测卡特尔的方法。该方法允许企业在针对卡特尔成员时采取合谋行为，而在其他情况下则保持竞争。在这类拍卖中，竞标者提交初始报价，随后可向下调整报价。由于初始报价存在折价，相近的初始报价表明成本相似，从而产生强烈的降价竞争动机。我们将那些相对于其他初始报价相近的配对而言，未能针对彼此更新报价、从而忽视这一动机的企业配对判定为合谋。我们的算法预测了乌克兰反垄断委员会的制裁结果：被判定为合谋的配对受到制裁的可能性是其他配对的九倍。