Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
财政竞争驱动的数字化
Digitalization through fiscal competition
摘要
This paper studies how fiscal competition among local governments shapes digitalization. We develop a dynamic two-region spatial general equilibrium model with digital services and manufacturing sectors. Frontier digital technology spills over to manufacturing and raises its productivity, while manufacturing activity generates data that feeds back into digital innovation. These bidirectional cross-sector externalities create a self-reinforcing growth loop whose strength is increasing in the manufacturing sector’s digital adaptability. However, since private agents fail to internalize these externalities, the laissez-faire equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient, with resources under-allocated to the digital services sector. A digital output subsidy and a manufacturing R&D data subsidy can jointly correct these externalities and implement the First-Best allocation. We further introduce tournament competition into the decentralized economy. Local governments compete for mobile digital talent by setting the two subsidy instruments to improve their regions’ relative growth performance. Aggregate welfare responds non-monotonically to tournament competition intensity. Moderate competition partially corrects the externalities and raises allocative efficiency above the laissez-faire level, while excessive competition drives subsidies beyond the social optimum into over-subsidization. This implies that well-designed fiscal competition can alleviate the externalities inherent in digitalization and enhance aggregate welfare.
中文摘要
本文研究地方政府间的财政竞争如何塑造数字化进程。我们构建了一个包含数字服务部门与制造业部门的动态两区域空间一般均衡模型。前沿数字技术外溢至制造业并提升其生产率，而制造业活动产生的数据又反馈至数字创新。这种双向跨部门外部性形成了一个自我强化的增长循环，其强度随制造业部门数字适应能力的提高而增强。然而，由于私人主体无法将这些外部性内部化，自由放任均衡是帕累托无效率的，资源对数字服务部门配置不足。数字产出补贴与制造业研发数据补贴可以共同纠正这些外部性并实现最优配置。我们进一步将锦标赛竞争引入分散经济。地方政府通过设定两种补贴工具争夺流动数字人才，以提升本地区的相对增长绩效。总福利对锦标赛竞争强度呈非单调响应。适度竞争部分纠正了外部性，并将配置效率提升至自由放任水平之上，而过度的竞争则使补贴超出社会最优水平，陷入过度补贴。这意味着设计良好的财政竞争能够缓解数字化固有的外部性并提升总福利。