Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
区分概率性错误与策略性错误
Disentangling Probabilistic and Strategic Errors
摘要
In many strategic environments with asymmetric information, systematic decision mistakes can arise from two sources: failures in probabilistic reasoning when updating beliefs and incorrect strategic inference about opponents’ private information or choices. Using a sequential belief elicitation design in persuasion games, we experimentally disentangle and quantify these two reasoning errors. We find that probabilistic and strategic reasoning errors are comparable in magnitude, largely orthogonal, and their patterns and overall degree are stable across various settings. These results suggest that an improved behavioral theory should account for both strategic naivete and non-Bayesian updating, without significant concern for their interaction.
中文摘要
在许多存在信息不对称的战略环境中，系统性决策失误可能源于两个因素：更新信念时的概率推理失误，以及对对手私人信息或选择的错误战略推断。通过在说服博弈中采用序贯信念诱导设计，我们通过实验分离并量化了这两种推理错误。研究发现，概率推理错误与战略推理错误在量级上相当，且基本相互独立，其模式与总体程度在不同情境下保持稳定。这些结果表明，改进的行为理论应同时考虑战略天真与非贝叶斯更新，而无需过度关注二者的交互作用。