Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
证券监管重要吗？强制披露、股票过度波动与1934年美国证券交易法
Does Securities Regulation Matter? Mandatory Disclosure, Excess Stock Volatility, and the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934
摘要
We examine whether the US Securities Exchange Act of 1934 significantly stabilized the market by introducing mandatory disclosure of information. We argue that mandatory information disclosure can curb stock manipulation by enhancing transparency, thereby reducing excess stock volatility. After a comprehensive assessment of the voluntary disclosure practices of companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange before 1934, we find that those with poor disclosure practices experienced a significantly greater reduction in volatility after the implementation of the act compared with those with good disclosure practices. Further analysis reveals that the liquidity of these companies with poor disclosure practices also improved significantly more than that of companies with better disclosure, and the improvement in liquidity was linked to the decrease in their volatility. Given that one key purpose of the act’s legislators was to reduce excess market volatility, our findings provide empirical support for considering this legislative aim successful.
中文摘要
本文考察了1934年美国《证券交易法》是否通过引入强制性信息披露显著稳定了市场。我们认为，强制性信息披露能够通过提升透明度抑制股票操纵行为，从而降低股票过度波动。在对1934年前纽约证券交易所上市公司自愿披露实践进行全面评估后，我们发现：相较于披露实践良好的公司，披露实践较差的公司在该法案实施后波动性下降幅度显著更大。进一步分析表明，这些披露实践较差公司的流动性改善程度也显著优于披露较好的公司，且流动性改善与其波动性下降存在关联。鉴于该法案立法者的核心目标之一是减少市场过度波动，我们的研究结果为认定该立法目标已成功实现提供了实证支持。