Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
更弱的就业保护会降低失业成本吗？
Does Weaker Employment Protection Lower the Cost of Job Loss?
摘要
Abstract Leveraging a major Italian reform enacted in July 2012 that eroded employment protection to workers on permanent contracts, we use detailed worker level administrative data to estimate how this reduction affected the cost of job loss. We employ a stacked event-study research design, comparing treated and untreated workers as they move from employment into nonemployment. Weakening employment protection led to additional penalties in terms of lower re-hiring earnings and lower re-employment probabilities. Heterogeneous effects of the reform deepened pre-existing divides, penalizing labor market outsiders, such as young workers, and curbing employment opportunities for individuals in poorer regions, such as the South.
中文摘要
摘要 利用意大利2012年7月实施的一项重大改革，该改革削弱了对永久合同工人的就业保护，我们采用详细的工人层面行政数据，估计这一削减如何影响失业成本。我们运用堆叠事件研究设计，比较受改革影响与未受影响的工人在从就业转向非就业过程中的差异。就业保护的弱化导致再就业收入降低和再就业概率下降的额外惩罚。改革的异质性效应加深了原有的分化，对劳动力市场边缘群体（如年轻工人）造成不利影响，并限制了较贫困地区（如南部）个体的就业机会。