Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
通过碳排放交易驱动异质性钢铁企业低碳技术扩散：一个演化博弈分析
Driving low-carbon technology diffusion in heterogeneous steel enterprises through carbon emissions trading: An evolutionary game analysis
摘要
Subjected to the carbon neutrality goal, the carbon emissions trading scheme (CETS) has become an essential market-oriented tool for carbon emission reduction in high-emission sectors like the steel industry through the diffusion of low-carbon technologies. However, the heterogeneous responses to CETS across enterprises of different scales remain unclear, limiting the differentiated policy design. This study presents a tripartite evolutionary game model involving the government, large-scale steel enterprise (LSE), and small-scale steel enterprise (SSE) to investigate the low-carbon technology diffusion driven by CETS. By incorporating enterprise-scale heterogeneity like innovation capacity, financing constraints, risk preferences, and policy responsiveness, the model examines the evolutionary pathways of technology adoption under various policy and market conditions. The results show that the evolutionary trajectory of low-carbon technology adoption follows a staged framework but a non-sequential progression, encompassing four distinct scenarios including low-incentive, government-driven promotion, multi-stakeholder collaborative adoption, and industry self-regulation. Shifts between these scenarios are contingent on the interplay of carbon price, quota allocation and other policies considering scale heterogeneity. LSE is highly sensitive to carbon price, while SSE requires relatively light quota constraints combined with sufficiently high carbon price to overcome the barriers for technology diffusion. Furthermore, when collaboration costs fall below a certain threshold, it can effectively shorten the cycle of corporate strategic adjustments, prompting businesses to swiftly transition from partial adoption to comprehensive implementation of low-carbon technologies. This study provides the theoretical understanding of CETS-induced technology diffusion and targeted policy insights for advancing the low-carbon transformation of the steel industry.
中文摘要
在碳中和目标的约束下，碳排放权交易机制（CETS）通过低碳技术扩散，已成为钢铁等高排放行业碳减排的重要市场化工具。然而，不同规模企业对CETS的异质性响应仍不清晰，限制了差异化政策的设计。本研究构建了一个涉及政府、大型钢铁企业（LSE）和小型钢铁企业（SSE）的三方演化博弈模型，以探究CETS驱动的低碳技术扩散。通过纳入企业规模异质性，如创新能力、融资约束、风险偏好和政策响应性，该模型考察了不同政策和市场条件下技术采纳的演化路径。结果表明，低碳技术采纳的演化轨迹遵循阶段性框架，但呈现非顺序推进，涵盖四种不同情景，包括低激励、政府驱动推广、多主体协同采纳和行业自律。这些情景之间的转换取决于碳价格、配额分配及其他考虑规模异质性的政策之间的相互作用。LSE对碳价格高度敏感，而SSE则需要相对宽松的配额约束与足够高的碳价格相结合，以克服技术扩散的障碍。此外，当协作成本降至某一阈值以下时，它可以有效缩短企业战略调整的周期，促使企业迅速从部分采纳转向全面实施低碳技术。本研究提供了对CETS引致技术扩散的理论理解，以及推进钢铁行业低碳转型的针对性政策启示。