Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
搜索条件下的动态价格竞争与演化行为
Dynamic Price Competition and Evolutionary Behavior with Search
摘要
This paper develops a model of dynamic pricing with boundedly rational consumer search. Consumers observe one price, can choose to engage in costly search to learn the other prices, and then purchase from the firm with the lowest observed price. Each consumer searches only if the observed price exceeds their dynamically tuned reservation price. Firms optimize given the current distribution of reservation prices. Short run pricing is characterized by Edgeworth cycles. Rather than resetting as a mixed strategy, each cycle resets when the firm with the larger installed base relents by monopolizing its residual demand. Both the lower and upper bounds of the cycles move with consumer search, though not necessarily in the same direction. Whether these cycles persist in the long run or the pricing dynamic converges to the Diamond paradox, the Bertrand paradox, or a kinked-demand equilibrium depends on exogenous conditions that we outline.
中文摘要
本文构建了一个包含有限理性消费者搜寻的动态定价模型。消费者观察到一种价格后，可选择进行成本性搜寻以了解其他价格，随后从提供最低观察价格的厂商处购买。每位消费者仅在观察到的价格超过其动态调整的保留价格时才会进行搜寻。厂商根据当前保留价格的分布进行优化定价。短期定价表现为埃奇沃斯循环特征。并非以混合策略重置，每个循环在拥有较大安装基数的厂商通过垄断其剩余需求而让步时结束。循环的下界与上界均随消费者搜寻行为变动，尽管变动方向未必一致。这些循环在长期内是否持续，或定价动态是否收敛于戴蒙德悖论、伯特兰悖论或弯折需求均衡，取决于我们所概述的外生条件。