Econ Papers Daily / 期刊论文
异质性购买频率下买家的动态筛选
Dynamic Screening of Buyers With Heterogeneous Purchase Frequency
摘要
We consider a dynamic buyer–seller interaction. Instead of the buyer's valuation, it is the frequency with which he needs to trade that is the buyer's private information. The difference matters. With commitment, full surplus extraction is possible, for instance via limited‐time offers. Without commitment, ratcheting is mitigated, as not buying is not necessarily a sign of strength. Because time is informative, the seller learns and may adjust her behavior over time. When finding a suitable alternative seller is easy, she starts with a pooling offer before permanently switching to a screening offer. When finding a suitable alternative seller takes time, she starts with a pooling offer before occasionally experimenting with separating offers.
中文摘要
我们研究了一种动态的买卖双方互动关系。与买方估值不同，买方需要交易的频率才是其私人信息。这一差异至关重要。在有承诺的情况下，完全剩余提取是可能的，例如通过限时报价。在没有承诺的情况下，棘轮效应得到缓解，因为不购买并不一定意味着买方处于强势地位。由于时间具有信息价值，卖方会随着时间推移学习并可能调整其行为。当寻找合适的替代卖方较为容易时，她会先提出混合报价，然后永久转向筛选报价。当寻找合适的替代卖方需要时间时，她会先提出混合报价，然后偶尔尝试分离报价。